Jokowi Presiden Indonesia

Jokowi Presiden Indonesia Gubernur Jakarta pro-reformasi, Joko Widodo dinyatakan sebagai pemenang pemilihan presiden dan akan memimpin Indonesia berikutnya, setelah melewati pemilu paling keras dan kotor setelah era reformasi. Di tengah tekanan kubu Prabowo Subianto untuk menunda hasil pemilu, dan diikuti penarikan diri dari seluruh proses satu jam menjelang pengumuman, Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) akhirnya mengumumkan bahwa Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla terpilih sebagai presiden dan wakil presiden Indonesia untuk lima tahun ke depan. Berdasarkan perhitungan resmi KPU, pasangan Joko Widodo.Jusuf Kalla meraih 53,1 persen suara, unggul dibanding pasangan Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Radjasa yang meraih 46,9 persen suara. Kubu Prabowo menolak melanjutkan proses pemungutan suara dan memerintahkan seluruh saksi dari pihaknya untuk mundur dari proses KPU. ”Kami menolak hasil pemilihan presiden 2014 yang cacat hukum, dan karena itu kami menarik diri dari proses yang sedang berlangsung,” kata Prabowo yang memberikan konferensi pers tanpa didampingi calon wakilnya Hatta Radjasa. Prabowo beralasan pemilihan umum ini berlangsung tidak demokratis, dan karenanya ia tidak bersedia ikut melanjutkan tahapan Pilpres. "Kami, Prabowo-Hatta, siap menang dan siap kalah dengan cara yang demokratis dan terhormat," kata Prabowo sambil meminta para pendukungnya agar tetap tenang. "Karena yakinlah, kami tidak akan diam dan membiarkan hak demokrasi kita diambil," kata Prabowo didampingi para ketua umum partai pendukungnya. Hasil hitung cepat sejumlah lembaga survei yang dikenal kredibel, sebelumnya memenangkan Jokowi. Dalam pemilihan presiden 2014, Indonesia dihadapkan pada dua pilihan yang sangat mencolok, antara Gubernur Jakarta Jokowi yang lahir dari tradisi baru kepemimpinan nasional yang tidak punya kaitan dengan era Suharto, berhadapan dengan bekas jenderal pasukan khusus, Prabowo Subianto, yang dianggap sebagai representasi elit politik era Orde Baru yang memiliki catatan masa lalu dalam soal pelanggaran hak asasi manusia. (Baca: Hantu Bernama Masa Lalu) Kemenangan Jokowi membuka tradisi baru, karena ia lahir dari keluarga miskin, bukan kalangan elit. Para investor juga banyak berharap Jokowi yang dikenal sebagai sosok bersih, akan menjadi pemenang, karena diharapkan bakal melakukan reformasi di Indonesia yang dikenal paling korup di dunia

Politics in Indonesia State Organs Law Making Process The People's Consultative Assembly The Supreme Advisory Council Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) The Supreme Court The President as Chief Executive The State Audit Board The Reform Development Cabinet The Government Apparatus High Officials with the Status of a State Minister Local Government The House of Representatives Administrative Division Regions The System of Deliberation and Voting STATE ORGANS According to the 1945 Constitution there are six organs of the state: 1. The People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat). 2. The Presidency. 3. The House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat). 4. The Supreme Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Agung). 5. The State Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan). 6. The Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung). Back to Top THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY Article 1 of the 1945 Constitution states that Indonesia is a republic with sovereignty vested in the people to be fully exercised by an elected People's Consultative Assembly, which is the highest political institution in the state. Since the Assembly holds the supreme power in the state, the people voice their political and social aspirations through this body. The major tasks of the Assembly are to sanction the Constitution, decide the Guidelines of State Policy, and elect the President and Vice-President for a term of office of five years. In relation to the Assembly, the President is its Mandatary and, as such, is accountable to the Assembly for the conduct of government. In the exercise of his duties, the President is assisted by the Vice-President. The total membership of the People's Consultative Assembly is twice the membership of the House of Representatives*). All members of the House are concurrently members of the Assembly. The second half of the Assembly's membership consists of members from political organizations, the various factions of the Armed Forces faction, and from Golkar. It also includes regional delegates and representatives from professional groups. When Act No. 5 of 1975 was in force (up to the general elections of 1982), the membership of the House was 460 and that of the Assembly 920. When the act was amended by Act No. 2 of 1985, the membership of the House grew to 500, and the membership of the Assembly to 1,000. Back to Top According to this later Act, the composition of the Consultative Assembly's membership is as follows: 1. The 500 members of the House of Representatives. 2. In addition to the above members of the House, political organizations contending in the general election, namely Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PDI and Golkar, as well as the Armed Forces faction in the House, are allowed additional membership that is proportionate to their respective membership in the House. As result of the 1997 General Elections, the above additional membership was 251. 3. Delegates from the First Level Regions or Provinces, shall number not less than four persons for a province with a population of less than 1 million, and not more than eight persons for a province with a population of 15 million people, making for a total of 149 delegates. These regional delegates are elected by their respective regional legislative assemblies. 4. Representatives of professional groups number 100 persons. These representatives are appointed by the President on the recommendations of their respective organizations or at the President's discretion. Based on Decree No. VII/MPR/1998, the Chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly will be separate from Chairman of the House of Representatives. He is assisted by five Vice-Chairmen. The election of the Assembly's chairman is by consensus among members. Where this is impossible, voting may be resorted to as provided for by the 1945 Constitution. The Assembly is composed of five factions: 1. The Armed Forces. 2. The Functional Group (Golkar). 3. The United Development Party (PPP). 4. The Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI). 5. The Regional delegates. The Assembly meets not less than once every five years in a General Session and may convene Special Sessions whenever the need arises. * On the composition of the House's membership, see under the heading: The House of Representatives. Back to Top Special Session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) One of the political agendas of Reform Cabinet is to hold a special session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in Jakarta on November 10-13, 1998. The session adopted the following 12 decrees: 1. Decree No. VII/MPR/1998 on amendment of the Assembly's internal rules stipulates that following the May-June 1999, general elections, the Assembly will elect its own leaders who will be separate from those of the House of Representatives. In the Past, Assembly leaders automatically held top posts in the House. The Assembly leadership will consist of a speaker and a maximum of five deputies nominated by political parties with the largest number of seats. 2. Decree No. VIII/MPR/ 1998 revokes the 1983 Assembly Decree on Referendum enables the amendment of the 1945 Constitution in the future. In the 1983 decree, followed by the 1985 referendum law, a referendum must be held before the Assembly can review the Constitution. 3. Decree No. IX/MPR/1998 revokes the 1998 decree on the Guidelines of the State Policy (GBHN). It was replaced by a scaled down document to cover the period up to the assembly's next general session scheduled in mid 1999. 4. Decree No. X/MPR/1998 on the principles of development reform to safeguard and normalize the life of the nation stipulates the objectives of development reform in the economic, political, legal, social and cultural fields. 5. The decree stipulates that the current economic crisis must be resolved and supported by reform measures. The management of the economic crisis includes a number of undetailed targets such as stabilizing the rupiah's exchange rate at reasonable level, managing the interest rates and inflation, bank restructuring, food security and solving the private sector debt problem. The political reform agenda covers the promulgation of new political laws to foster democratization and facilitate a fair, direct and free general election by secret ballot in mid 1999. It also includes provisions to check government power, introduce good governance and adjust the military's dual function in accordance with its new paradigm. The legal reform agenda deals with division of power between the judicative and executive branches of government and contains clauses designed to ensure supremacy of the law and protect basic human rights. The most notable points on the agenda for socio-cultural reform are the social safety net programs covering education, employment and health, the preparation of legal instruments, infrastructure and programs of action to foster ethics in business, professions and public administration. 6. Decree No. XI/MPR/1998 on good governance, free from corruption, collusion and nepotism instructs the government to investigate and deal firmly with former and incumbent government officials, their families, and cronies as well as business people suspected of corruption, collusion and nepotism. 7. The decree stipulates that officials shall publicly disclose their wealth before and after their appointment and have them audited by an institution set up by the head of state. The institution will be staffed by representatives of the government and the people. The decree also requires an amendment of the anti-corruption law to combat graft. 8. Decree No. XII/MPR/1998 revokes the 1998 decree granting special powers in March to the then President Soeharto to declare a state of emergency and to do anything necessary to maintain security and stability in the country. 9. Decree No. XIII limits the term of office for the president and vice president to a maximum of two five-year terms. 10. Decree No. XIV/MPR/1998 states that a general election will be held by next May or June at the latest and that the election will be organized by an independent election committee whose members will comprise representatives of political parties, non-governmental organization and the government. 11. Decree No. XV/MPR/1998 on the administration of regional autonomy, management, distribution and harnessing of natural resources fairly by maintaining a fiscal balance between the provincial administration and the central government in the unitary state of the republic of Indonesia to improve the welfare of local people and the nation as a whole. 12. The fiscal balance between the central and provincial government is to be set with respect to the potential, size and population of each province and local people's income levels. 13. Decree No. XVI/MPR/1998 on political economy in an economic democracy stipulates that : * National economic development is designed to create a broad base of small and medium-scale enterprises (SME) and to foster mutually-beneficial relations between cooperatives, SMEs, large companies and state enterprises. * The implementation of economic democracy shall seek to avoid the concentration of economic assets and forces in the hands of a small number of people and companies. * Cooperatives and medium-scale enterprises, as the main pillars of national economic development, shall be given as many opportunities, incentives and assistance as possible, without ignoring the role of big business and state enterprises. * National land use shall be organized in a just manner and the concentration of land use rights and land ownership in the hands of a few individuals or companies shall be prevented to enhance the strength of cooperatives, SMEs and the people at large. * Banks and financial institutions shall give top priority to cooperatives and SMEs while continuing to work on the principle of sound business management. * Bank Indonesia as the central bank shall be independent and free of interference from the government and all other parties and shall be accountable for its conduct. * Foreign borrowing by the government needs the approval of the House of Representatives within the annual state budget and foreign debts shall strengthen, and not burden, the national economy. * The private sector shall be fully responsible for its foreign borrowing and shall be closely monitored by the government in a transparent manner. * Economic democracy for workers shall be achieved through labor participation and freedom of association in line with the law and ownership share in the company employing them. 14. Decree No. XVII/MPR/1998 on human rights requires all state institutions to enforce and respect them and that the president and the House of Representative (DPR) ratify all United Nations conventions on human rights. 15. A law must be issued to give the National Commission on Human Rights the legal authority to monitor and report on the implementation of human rights conventions. The current Commission was established by presidential decree in January 1994. 16. Decree No. XVIII/MPR/1998 revokes the 1978 Assembly decree on the Propagation and Implementation of Pancasila (P4). This decree rules that the government must stop the compulsory P4 propagation program, and added a chapter to the original draft decree on the right to information. Back to Top The President as Chief Executive In the government system of Indonesia, the President is both head of state and chief executive. He holds office for a term of five years and is eligible for re-election. Since the President is also the Mandatary of the People's Consultative Assembly, he must execute his duties in compliance with the Guidelines of State Policy as decreed by the Assembly. Back to Top The Reform Development Cabinet After Soeharto resigned the new President, B.J. Habibie, announced his cabinet and swore them in on May 23, 1998. B.J. Habibie named his cabinet the Development Reform Cabinet. The Development Reform Cabinet is composed as follows: 1. Minister of Home Affairs: Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid 2. Minister of Foreign Affairs: Ali Alatas, SH. 3. Minister of Defense and Security: Gen. Wiranto 4. Minister of Justice: Muladi 5. Minister of Information: Lt. Gen. Yunus Yosfiah 6. Minister of Finance: Bambang Subianto 7. Minister of Trade and Industry: Rahardi Ramelan 8. Minister of Agriculture: Soleh Solahuddin 9. Minister of Forestry: Muslimin Nasution 10. Minister of Mining and Energy: Kuntoro Mangkusubroto 11. Minister of Public Works: Rachmadi B. Sumadhijo 12. Minister of Communications: Giri Suseno Hadihardjono 13. Minister of Cooperatives, Small and Medium Enterprises: Adi Sasono 14. Minister of Manpower: Fahmi Idris 15. Minister of Transmigration Resettlemet of Forest Squatters: AM Hendropriyono 16. Minister of Tourism, Arts and Culture: Marzuki Usman 17. Minister of Education and Culture: Juwono Sudarsono 18. Minister of Health: Farid Anfasa Moeloek 19. Minister of Religious Affairs: Malik Fajar 20. Minister of Social Affairs: Yustika S. Baharsyah Departments 1-5 above comprise the Political and Security field, 6-17 comprise the Economic, Financial and Industrial field and 18-21 make up the field of People's Welfare. Back to Top Coordinating Ministers 21. Minister Co-ordinator for Political and Security Affairs: Feisal Tanjung 22. Minister Co-ordinator for Economic, Financial, and Industrial Affairs: Ginandjar Kartasasmita 23. Minister Co-ordinator for People's Welfare/Poverty Eradication: Haryono Suyono 24. Minister Co-ordinator for Development Supervision/State Administrative Reform: Hartarto Sastrosoenarto State Ministers 25. Minister/State Secretary: Akbar Tanjung 26. Minister of State for National Development Planning concurrently Chairman of the National Development Planning Board: Boediono 27. Minister of State for Research and Technology concurrently Chairman of the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology: Zuhal 28. Minister of State for Population Affairs concurrently Chairman of National Family Planning Coordinating Board: Ida Bagus Oka 29. Minister of State for People's Housing and Settlement: Theo L. Sambuaga 30. Minister of State for Youth Affairs and Sports: R. Agung Laksono 31. Minister of State for Empowerment of State Enterprises: Tanri Abeng 32. Minister of State for the Role of Women: Tuti Alawiyah 33. Minister of State for Food and Horticulture: A.M. Saefuddin 34. Minister of State for Mobilization of Investment Funds/Chair-man of the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM): Hamzah Haz 35. Minister of State for Agrarian Affairs/Chairman of the National Agrarian Board: Hasan Basri Durin 36. Minister of State for Environment concurrently Chairman of Environmental Impact Management Board: Panangian Siregar Back to Top High Officials with the Status of a State Minister 1. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces: Gen. Wiranto 2. Attorney General: A.M. Ghalib 3. Governor of Bank Indonesia (Central Bank): Syahril Sabirin The structure and organization of governmental departments are uniform, as provided for in Presidential Decision No. 44 of 1974. This requires that a government department shall consist of four components, namely: 1. The leadership, which is in the hands of the minister 2. The administrative services headed by a secretary-general 3. The operational services, each headed by a director-general 4. The institutional control, to be exercised by an inspector-general. As time has passed, the various government departments have expanded in size and responsibilities to accommodate the rising demands in public administration. Hence, a fifth component has been added, namely, a research and development division whose head has the same rank as the other executives. All these executives are appointed and dismissed by the President on the recommendation of the minister. In the exercise of their duties, however, they are answerable to the minister. They are guided by the principles of coordination, integration and synchronization within their own department as well as in relation to other departments and institutions. The secretariat-general is divided into bureaus with a maximum number of five. Each directorate-general is divided into directorates numbering no more than five, and the inspectorate-general is divided into inspectorates, also numbering five at most. The research and development division may have a number of centers, each with a specific task in research and development to meet the growing requirements of the department. Back to Top The House of Representatives The total membership of the House of Representatives is 500. It is composed of: 1. 425 members representing the political organizations that take part in the general election, i.e., Partai Persatuan, Golkar and PDI; 2. 75 members appointed from the Armed Forces. To determine the number of the elected members in the House, the following procedure applies. Each elected member represents at least 400,000 citizens. Hence, if the population is estimated at 197.013.619 people, the total number of elected members is 425. (The General Elections Institute). During general elections the provinces form constituencies and are entitled to representation by elected members, the number being derived from the division of the provincial population by 400,000. Provinces with very small populations are represented by a number of elected members not less than the number of districts in the province and each district shall have not less than one representative.. The reason for the appointment of 75 members from the Armed Forces is that they are not only an instrument of defense and security, they also constitute a socio-political force. However, servicemen cannot take part in general elections. To ensure that they are not denied their political rights as citizens, their representatives in the House are appointed on the recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The House consists of four factions, representing Golkar, the Armed Forces, the United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI). Back to Top The System of Deliberation and Voting Deliberations are held in the House to reach a consensus (mufakat) on any question. In the event a consensus is not achieved, the matter is referred to the Steering Committee. Should this Committee arrive at a consensus, all members will be duly informed. In case of failure, the matter is submitted to the plenary session of the House, which must then decide whether the matter is to be put to a vote, postponed or dropped altogether. Voting requires the presence of all factions and a quorum of two-thirds of the total membership of the house. Resolutions or decisions are adopted by majority votes. Voting on nominations and appointments is done by secret ballot; on any other matters, by a show of hands. If a vote cannot be accomplished because a two-third's quorum cannot be reached or because all factions are not present, the matter is returned to the Steering Committee. The annual session of the House starts on August 16 and ends on August 15 of the following year. Each session is divided into meetings with intervals for recesses. At the opening of each annual session of the House, the President delivers his address of state. This is always on August 16, the day before Indonesia's independence day commemoration. In the address the President reviews the developments of the past year and outlines the prospects for the coming year. Back to Top Law Making Process The 1945 Constitution states that the House of Representatives is the body of the State. The Government submits bills to the House for consideration and approval, but members of the House can initiate their own bills. Such bills must be accompanied by an explanatory memorandum, signed by at least 30 members, and submitted to the Speaker of the House. During the discussion of the proposed bill, the initiating members may make alterations or withdraw it. If the House passes the bill, it will become law when it has obtained the signature of the President. By authority of the President, the Minister/State Secretary will publish the Act in the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia and henceforth the Act comes into force. Back to Top The Supreme Advisory Council Following Article 16 of the 1945 Constitution and Act No. 3 of 1967 as amended by Act No. 4 of 1978, the functions of the Supreme Advisory Council are to answer any questions that the President may ask in relation to the affairs of the State, including questions on political, economic, socio-cultural and military affairs. Conversely, the Council may submit recommendations or express its views on any matter of national importance. Members of the Council are nominated by the House and appointed by the President for a term of five years. Certain set conditions must be met to qualify for appointments. The Council is headed by a Chairman and has four Vice-Chairmen and 45 members. The permanent committees of the Council are: 1. The political committee. 2. The economic, financial and industrial committee. 3. The committee on people's welfare. 4. The committee on defense and security. Back to Top The Supreme Court The Supreme Court is the judicial arm of the State and exists beside the legislative and the executive branches. It enjoys an independent status in the socio-political fabric. It was not until 1968 that the restructuring of the Supreme Court was completed to meet the conditions set out in the 1945 Constitution, i.e., to be free from government intervention in the exercise of justice. In 1970 a law was enacted that laid down the basic principle of Indonesia's judicial powers. Back to Top The State Audit Board The functions of the State Audit Board are outlined in Article 23 of the 1945 Constitution. Its main function is to conduct official examinations of government financial accounts. The findings of the Board are submitted to the House of Representatives, which approves the government budget. In his annual state address on August 16, the President reports to the House on the Government's performance during the past fiscal year. Detailed accounts of government revenues and expenditures and a full report on the progress achieved in development and administration, are recounted in the supplement to the presidential speech. Back to Top The Government Apparatus A major concern of the Government has been the creation of an efficient, clean and respectable administration on national and regional level. This is understandable considering that the progress achieved in national development has created considerable expansion in government activities and responsibilities, and pressing public demands for continuous improvements and streamlining of routine and more often of development administration. Government regulations that prove to be unnecessary red tape have been abolished by deregulation and debureaucratization. However, administrative reform that will achieve the ideal results is a long and painstaking effort. Thus, preventive and repressive actions have been and will continue to be taken until abuse of authority and malpractice on the part of the state apparatus are reduced to a minimum or, hopefully, eliminated. Back to Top Local Government The structure and organization of local governments follow the pattern of the national government. On the national level, the President is the Chief Executive and works with a cabinet of ministers. Next to the national executive is the House of Representatives, with whom the government enacts laws and determines the national budget. Similarly, the Governor is the Chief Executive in the province and works with a staff of regional officials. Side by side is the provincial legislative, with whom the regional government concurs on regional legislation and decisions on the budget. On the district (Kabupaten) and municipal (Kotamadya) levels, the Chief Executives are respectively, the Bupati (district head) and Walikota kodya (mayor). Again, the Bupati/Walikota kodya concurs with the local legislative on matters relating to local government regulation and the budget. Both provincial and district municipality governments are granted autonomy. Where the President is the Head of State, the Governor is the Head of the Province and concurrently represents the Central Government in his region. Similarly, the Bupati/Walikota kodya is the Head of the Kabupaten/kotamadya and concurrently represents the Governor in his district/municipality. The procedure of appointing a governor is as follows: The provincial legislature elects two or three candidates. The election result is reported to the national government, via the Minister of Home Affairs. The winning candidate is then appointed Governor by the President on the recommendation of the Minister. In a similar way, the Kabupaten/kotamadya legislature elects two or three candidates to be proposed to the Minister of Home Affairs. One of these then is appointed Bupati/Walikota kodya, by the Minister on the recommendation of the Governor. Below the district municipal level the administrative units are not autonomous. These are the Kecamatan, or Sub-District Administrations and the Kelurahan, or the Village Administrations. The Kecamatan is an administrative sub-division of the Kabupaten or Kotamadya. It is headed by a Camat. The Kecamatan office is in charge of the administration of the sub-district, social welfare and economic affairs. Some national government departments have branches in the Kecamatan office. Back to Top The system of village administration is not much different from that of the Kecamatan. The Lurah, who heads the kelurahan, is assisted by a secretary and section heads. Unlike the Kecamatan, however, national government departments do not have branch offices in a Kelurahan. Both the Camat and the Lurah are civil servants appointed on merit from the ranks of local government officials. In the Desa, or village, the administrative system is somewhat different. The village head, is elected by the village's adult population. The elected candidate is then appointed by the Bupati on behalf of the governor. In the office of the village head there is a secretary and several section heads. A unique feature of village life is the Village Council of Elders, which is composed of 9 to 15 prominent village leaders. The Council makes decisions in concurrence with the village head. In fact, this grass-roots level administration of the village, with its indigenous system of democracy and mutual help, was the inspiration of the founding fathers of the Republic when they decided on the government as laid down in Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The "Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa" is a village organization whose task is to promote socio-economic conditions so that the village becomes a viable rural community. The organization is headed by the Village Head or Lurah who is assisted by a secretary. Other members of the organization are drawn from the village community. Community living is fostered by two neighborhood organizations. "The Rukun Tetangga" takes care of social and administrative matters of a neighborhood, such as the registration of families, security, garbage collection, etc. "The Rukun Warga" is the coordinating organization of a number of Rukun Tetangga. Both these organizations are voluntary and non-formal and mainly designed to assist in the work of Lurah/village head. Regional Finance 1. The budget for regional administration and development is composed of the following: 2. Budget allocation from the Central Government to Local Governments. 3. Central Government grants to Local Governments. 4. Taxes collected by Local Governments with the approval of the Central Government. 5. Corporate profits of Local Government enterprises. e. Credits secured by Local Governments. Back to Top Administrative Division Regions The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is divided into 27 provinces which are sub-divided into 243 districts, 55 municipalities, 16 administrative municipalities, 35 administrative cities, and 3,841 sub-districts or kecamatans. Three of the provinces are special territories, namely the Capital City of Jakarta, the Special Territory of Yogyakarta, and the Special Territory of Aceh. Villages are classified into desas or rural villages and kelurahans or urban villages. The head of a desa, is elected by the village community, whereas the head of a kelurahan which is called lurah, is a civil servant appointed by a camat or head of a sub-district on behalf of the governor. http://www.asianinfo.org/asianinfo/indonesia/pro-politics.htm

Indonesia, ASEAN, and the Third Indochina War

Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mochtar Kusumaatmadja was chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee in December 1978 when Vietnam invaded Cambodia, initiating what some observers called the Third Indochina War (1978-91). Mochtar's response, which became the official ASEAN response, was to deplore the Vietnamese invasion and call for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Cambodia. Indonesia and other ASEAN members immediately placed the issue on the agenda of the UN Security Council. It was not long after the invasion, however, that deep differences between Indonesia and Thailand, the "frontline state," regarding the long-term interests of ASEAN were revealed. Although compelled to make a show of solidarity with Thailand by its interest in sustaining ASEAN itself, Indonesia began to see the prolongation of the war in Cambodia, the "bleeding Vietnam white" strategy, as not being in its or the region's interests. Although never retreating from ASEAN's central demand of Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia and Khmer self-determination, Indonesia actively sought to engage the Khmers and Vietnamese and their external sponsors in a search for a settlement that would recognize legitimate interests on all sides. From 1982 to the signing of the Final Act of the Paris International Conference on Cambodia on October 23, 1991, Indonesian diplomacy played a central role in peace negotiations under both Mochtar and his successor, Ali Alatas. Indonesia opened what came to be called "dual-track" diplomacy, in which it pursued bilateral political communication with Vietnam while maintaining its commitment to the ASEAN formula. By 1986 ASEAN had accepted Indonesia its official "interlocutor" with Vietnam. The breakthrough came in July 1987, in the Mochtar-Nguyen Co Thach (Vietnam's minister of foreign affairs) communiqué in which Vietnam accepted the idea of an informal meeting between the Khmer parties, to which other concerned countries would be invited. This was the so-called "cocktail party" formula. This eventually led to the first Jakarta Informal Meeting in July 1988, at which the issue of the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia--the external question--was decoupled from the Khmer "civil war"--the internal question. The second Jakarta Informal Meeting took place in February 1989 after a change of government in Thailand had radically shifted Bangkok's policy toward a quick negotiated settlement. The second Jakarta meeting, chaired by Alatas, at which Vietnam accepted the notion of an "international control mechanism" for Cambodia, was followed by escalating diplomatic activity--efforts that led to the July 1990 Paris International Conference on Cambodia cochaired by Indonesia and France. The conference adjourned without making great progress, but by then international events influencing great power relations had outpaced ASEAN's and Indonesia's ability to coordinate. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council--working through Paris International Conference on Cambodia channels--took up the challenge of negotiating a peace settlement in Cambodia and, with Indonesia assuming a burdensome diplomatic role, fashioned a peace agreement that led to the deployment of forces of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Indonesia's sense of achievement and pride in its role in bringing peace to Indochina was reflected in three events. On November 12, 1990, Suharto arrived in Hanoi for the first meeting between an ASEAN head of government and a Vietnamese counterpart since Premier Pham Van Dong visited Thailand's prime minister Kriangsak Chomanand in 1977. On March 15, 1992, Japan's Akashi Yasushi, the UN undersecretary general for disarmament and newly appointed head of UNTAC, arrived in Phnom Penh to be greeted by a color guard of Indonesian troops who were part of the first full battalion-sized contingent of UNTAC peacekeepers dispatched to Cambodia. At the peak deployment of foreign peacekeeping forces in late 1992, Indonesia had the largest force in Cambodia with nearly 2,000 military and police personnel, representing 10 percent of the total. Finally, in mid-1991, fresh from diplomatic success in helping to end the Cambodian civil war, Indonesia took the initiative in seeking to open multilateral negotiations on competitive South China Sea claims, especially those claims involving jurisdictional disputes over the Spratly Islands. Indonesia's gradually assertive role in the Cambodian peace effort demonstrated that Jakarta was not entirely willing to place its commitment to ASEAN solidarity above its own national interests. The Jakarta Post, often reflective of official positions, thundered in an editorial, "It is high time to spell out clearly to our ASEAN partners, as the largest archipelagic state in Southeast Asia with a growing national interest to protect, that we simply cannot afford the endless prolonging of the Kampuchean conflict." A caption in the Far Eastern Economic Review caught the mood more succinctly: "Indonesia in ASEAN: fed up being led by the nose." Less colloquially, Indonesian analyst Dewi Fortuna Anwar wrote in the Review: "The challenge for Indonesian foreign policy in the future is how to maintain a balance between an ASEAN policy which requires goodwill and trust of the other members, and satisfying some of the internationalist aspirations of a growing number of the Indonesian political elite." The settlement of the Cambodian conflict, Southeast Asia's own cold war, combined with the dramatically altered balance of power in the region, raised the question of what new political cement might hold ASEAN together in the post-Cold War environment in the early 1990s. Competitive claims by the nations involved in the jurisdictional competition in the South China Sea had the potential for conflict but did not pose the direct threat to ASEAN's collective security interest, as had the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia. General suspicion about China's long-term ambitions in the region was too diffuse to generate consensual policy. Indonesia, still insisting that ZOPFAN had validity for the region, initially looked coolly on United States efforts to enhance its military access elsewhere in Southeast Asia after the closure of its Philippines' military base. Jakarta did not want to create an even more legitimate opportunity for superpower intervention in its region. Indonesia resisted the urging of some ASEAN members that ASEAN formally adopt a more explicit common political-security identity. Indonesia successfully opposed Singapore's proposal at the ASEAN Fourth Summit that would have invited the UN Security Council's five permanent members to accede to ASEAN's 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Although very cool to the notion that some kind of Helsinki-like formula for regional peace and security could be extended to Asia, Indonesia agreed to a political and security agenda for ASEAN's annual PostMinisterial Conference with its official partners. In part, Indonesian ambivalence about an ASEAN security role, together with its reluctance to mesh its economy with an ASEAN regional economy, arose from Indonesia's desire to keep its options open as it pursued its interests, not just as an ASEAN country, but as an increasingly important Asia-Pacific regional power. However, even as Indonesia looked beyond Southeast Asia to enhance its status as an important middle power, ASEAN still provided a valuable instrument for wielding noncoercive regional influence and gaining attention in the wider international arena. (countrystudies.us/indonesia)

POLITICAL CULTURE

Because of the general acceptance by the people, Indonesia's New Order government usually gains at least passive approval of its actions and style by what the ruling elite has characterized as the "floating masses." This approval in the early 1990s was based in part on an acknowledgment of the material benefits that flowed from real economic growth. The approval was also partly based on the fact that the government's acts and style fit into shared cultural patterns of values and expectations about leadership. In a country as ethnically diverse as Indonesia--from Melanesian tribe members of Irian Jaya to Jakarta's Chinese Indonesian millionaires--and with its population differentially incorporated into the modern political economy, it was difficult to identify a political culture shared in common by all Indonesians. Nevertheless, there were major cultural forces at work in Indonesia that did affect the political judgments of large groups of Indonesians. Traditional Political Culture In the late twentieth century, there were as many traditional political cultures in Indonesia as there were ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the similarity to the Javanese kingship model of Suharto's increasingly paternalistic rule reflects the Javanese cultural underpinnings of the New Order. Although Indonesia was a cultural mosaic, the Javanese, with more than 45 percent of the total population in the 1990s, were by far the largest single ethnic group. Moreover, they filled--to a degree beyond their population ratio--the most important roles in government and ABRI. The officer corps in particular was Javanized, partly as a result of Java's central role in the development of modern Indonesia (Indonesia's five leading institutions of higher education were located on Java, for example), but also because ABRI seemed to regard the great predominance of Javanese in the officer ranks as a matter of policy. The Javanese cultural predispositions influenced, therefore, the way the government appealed to the population and interactions within the New Order elite. On Java power historically has been deployed through a patrimonial bureaucratic state in which proximity to the ruler was the key to command and rewards. This power can be described in terms of a patron-client relation in which the patron is the bapak (father or elder). The terms of deference and obedience to the ruler are conceived in the Javanese gustikawula (lord-subject) formulation, which describes man's relationship to God as well as the subject's relationship to his ruler. The reciprocal trait for obedience is benevolence. In other words, benefits flow from the center to the obedient. By extension government's developmental activities are a boon to the faithful. Bureaucratically Javanese culture is suffused with an attitude of obedience--respect for seniors, conformity to hierarchical authority, and avoidance of confrontation-- characteristics of the preindependence priyayi class whose roots go back to the traditional Javanese courts. Javanism also has a mystical, magical dimension in its religiously syncretic belief system, which integrated pre-Indian, Indian, and Islamic beliefs. Its practices include animistic survivals, which invest sacred heirlooms (pusaka) with animating spirits, and rites of passage whose antecedents are pre-Islamic. Javanism also encompasses the introspective ascetic practices of kebatinan (mysticism as related to one's inner self), which seek to connect the microcosms of the self to the macrocosms of the universe. This adaptive belief system defines Suharto's underlying spiritual orientation. Furthermore, the politics of Javanism have been defensive, seeking to preserve its particular heterogenous practices from demands for Islamic orthodoxy. Rather than Islamic political parties, the Javanese have often turned to more secular parties: Sukarno's Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), the PKI, and Golkar. Islamic Political Culture Of Indonesia's population, 87.1 percent identified themselves as Muslim in 1980. This number was down from 95 percent in 1955. The figures for 1985 and 1990 were not released by the government's Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), suggesting a further decline that would fuel the fires of Muslim indignation over Christianization and secularization under the New Order. Nevertheless, Indonesia was still the largest Muslim nation in the world in the early 1990s, united with the universal Islamic community (ummah) not only in the profession of faith but also in adherence to Islamic law. The appeal of Islam was not weakened when it was supplanted by modern secular nationalism as the basis for the independent Indonesian state. In fact, given the prominence of Islamic proselytization and reinvigoration, the people's desire to maintain Islamic institutions and moral values arguably was at an all-time high in Indonesia. There was, however, a separation between Islam as a cultural value system and Islam as a political movement. Islam in Indonesia is not monolithic. The majority of Indonesia's nominal or statistical Muslims, abangan, are, to varying degrees of self-awareness, believers in kebatinan. Orthodox Islam is, in fact, a minority religion, and the term often used to describe the orthodox believer is santri. A rough measurement of the appeal of orthodox Islam is the size of the electorate supporting explicitly Muslim political parties, which in the general elections of 1977 and 1982 approached 30 percent. In a pluralistic setting, such numbers might be expected to represent political strength. This correlation would exist in Indonesia if Indonesian Islam spoke with a single, unified voice. In the early 1990s it did not. The santri consisted of both traditionalists and modernists, traditionalists seeking to defend a conservatively devout way of life, protecting orthodoxy as much as possible from the demands of the modern state, and modernists striving to adapt Indonesian Islam to the requirements of the modern world. The principal organization reflecting the traditionalist outlook was Nahdatul Ulama (literally, "revival of the religious teachers," but commonly referred to as the Muslim Scholars' League) founded in 1926. Nahdatul Ulama had its roots in the traditional rural Islamic schools (pesantren) of Central and East Java. Claiming more than 30 million members, in 1992 Nahdatul Ulama was the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia. Although its rural teachers and adherents reflected its traditional orientation, it was led into the 1990s by Abdurrahman Wahid, grandson of Nahdatul Ulama's founder, a "democrat" with a non-exclusive vision of Islam and the state. Modernist, or reformist, Islam in Indonesia was best exemplified by the Muhammadiyah (followers of Muhammad), founded in 1912 when the spirit of the Muslim reform movement begun in Egypt in the early 1900s reached Southeast Asia. In addition to modernizing Islam, the reformists sought to purify (critics argue Arabize) Indonesian Islam. Both santri streams found formal political expression in the postindependence multiparty system. The Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims (Masyumi) was the main political vehicle for the modernists. However, its activities were inhibited by the PRRI-Permesta regional rebellions between 1957 and 1962 and the party was banned in 1959. Nahdatul Ulama competed in the politics of the 1950s, and seeking to capitalize on Masyumi's banning, collaborated with Sukarno in the hope of winning patronage and followers. Nahdatul Ulama also hoped to stop the seemingly inexorable advance of the secular left under the leadership of the PKI. Although organized Islamic political parties in the New Order were prohibited from advancing an explicitly Islamic message, traditional systems of communication within the community of believers, including instruction in Islamic schools and mosque sermons, passed judgments on politics and politicians. Modern Political Culture The major components of Indonesia's modern political culture were derived from two central goals of the New Order government: stability and development. If authority in the Suharto era was based on ABRI's coercive support, the government's legitimacy rested on its success in achieving sociopolitical stability and economic development. Indonesian political culture in the early 1990s primarily reflected nontraditional, nonethnic, and secular values. Urban centered, truly national in its scope, and more materialistically focused, Indonesia's politics in the 1990s were influenced by both domestic and international developments. Like Islam, Indonesia's modern political culture was not monolithic. In the early 1990s, there was a variety of subcultures: bureaucratic, military, intellectual, commercial, literary, and artistic, each with its own criteria for judging politics, but all directed to the successful operation of the modern political system. Perhaps the two most important modern subcultures were the military and the intellectuals. It was the military subculture that set the tone for the first two decades of the Suharto government, both in terms of its ethos and in the direct participation of military officers at all levels of government and administration. Although increasingly professional in a technical sense, ABRI never lost its conception of itself as the embodiment of the national spirit, standing above the social, ethnic, and religious divisions of the country as a unifying institution. Even though factions existed within ABRI, it exemplified dwifungsi, the special link between soldier and state. ABRI was not above politics, but it was not part of the open political competition. The concerns of academics, writers, and other intellectuals in the early 1990s were different and they were more likely to be influenced by Western political values. It was from these circles that the pressure for democratization came. Their outlet was not political parties but cause-oriented nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), workshops, seminars, rallies, and, occasionally, demonstrations. The government undertook a major effort to subsume all of Indonesia's political cultures, with their different and often incompatible criteria for legitimacy, into a national political culture, an Indonesian culture based on the values set forth in the Pancasila. (/countrystudies.us/indonesia)

POLITICS, GOVERNANCE, AND SECURITY TO FUTURE OF INDONESIA DEVELOPTMENT

POLITICS, GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY Research in the area of politics, security and governance addresses issues of domestic and international political change, conflict, and cooperation and is comparative and regional in orientation. The study area focuses on: Implications of rapid socio-economic development on political institutions and processes; How political systems and leaders are adapting to and dealing with new pressures and challenges; Domestic and international conflict reduction and resolution; Development of pluralistic governance structures; Impacts of “human security” issues; and Evolution of norms, values, and institutions at the domestic and international level. Within the Asia Pacific, as well as internationally, there is a critical and immediate need for the development of national policy, legislation and institutional capacity building to put in place and carry out comprehensive all-hazards disaster management. Senior Fellow Allen L. Clark’s research focuses on the areas of urban risk assessment and management and environment and natural disasters. For most nations of the Asia Pacific, these areas, while critical, are poorly understood and coordinated so research highlighting the most effective policies and legislation will lead to more effective and comprehensive urban planning and national disaster management programs. Effective democratic governance continues to be one of the greatest challenges of the Asia Pacific region as countries cope with demands of the global economy and pressures from citizens for increased transparency and participation. Senior Fellow Shabbir Cheema's research focuses on civil society engagement in democratic change, cross-border governance for regional actions dealing with climate change and human trafficking, electoral and parliamentary processes to sustain democracy, and civil service reform and resource management to promote economic development. Research, dialogue and institutional partnerships in these areas will contribute to enhancing national and regional capacities to formulate and implement effective policies for sustainable development. Dr. Cheema is also coordinating the multi-year Asia Pacific Governance and Democracy Initiative (AGDI). AGDI contributes to national and regional institutional and leadership capacities by focusing on civil society engagement for democratic change, cross-border governance for regional actions, electoral and parliamentary processes to sustain democracy, transparency and anti-corruption strategies to promote trust in government and civil service reform and resource management to foster economic development. In partnership with the national, regional and global institutions, the AGDI undertakes policy relevant research, organizes dialogues and workshops, documents the emerging regional trends and issues, and undertakes strategic outreach activities at the country level. Christopher McNally’s research focuses on the political economy of China. One of his current projects is a macro-analysis of China's emergent political economy, especially the key dilemmas facing the world as China undergoes a capitalist transition. Specifically, the project applies a political economy perspective to the on-going debate on how China’s rise will impact the global system and holds that China’s international ascent is generating Sino-capitalism – a global capitalist system that differs from Anglo-American capitalism in important respects. Three distinct quandaries are emerging as the world adapts to the ascent of Sino-capitalism: a.) how to sustain international economic governance as economic power shifts; b.) how to manage the geopolitical dimension, in which both systems will vie to govern the global political economy; and c.) how to absorb Sino-capitalism in an ecological system with limited resources and capacity for waste absorption. McNally’s other major project focuses on China’s western development. This project aims to describe and analyze the intent and possible consequences of the People's Republic of China's campaign to “Open Up the West.” Current research intends to explore the implications of the campaign for southwestern China and neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. In particular, research aims to create an impressionistic survey of the effects of the “Open Up the West” campaign, including its effects on real estate development, tourism, the growing “temple economy,” and efforts to step up ecological protection and preservation. A major project in this area includes one by former fellow Sheila A. Smith entitled Shifting Terrain: The Domestic Politics of U.S. Military Presence in Asia Pacific. The study seeks to increase understanding of the relationship between the U.S. forward military presence and local political forces in Japan, Korea and the Philippines. This research involved key local personnel and U.S. diplomatic and military personnel in workshops and consultations. Workshops have been held in Okinawa, Japan and Seoul, Korea, and the final workshop was held in Bohol, Philippines. A Special Report on the project has been published. Smith remains associated with the Center as an adjunct fellow. The Asian International Justice Initiative (AIJI) builds upon four years of collaboration between the East-West Center and the War Crimes Studies Center (University of California, Berkeley) on projects related to human rights. In 2006, AIJI mounted a conference “Lessons Learned from the UN Serious Crimes Trials in East Timor” aimed at promoting regional discussions on international justice issues and reflecting on the experience of five years of the Serious Crimes Process that took place in Dili. This conference had significant implications for the Khmer Rouge Tribunals which are slated to begin in Cambodia in 2007. AIJI’s activities in Cambodia focus on the training of the prosecution and defense counsels of the Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of Cambodia (the UN hybrid tribunal); a film outreach project that is airing on Cambodian prime time TV and being shown in community forums, is designed to help Cambodians better understand the Khmer Rouge trials and fair trial standards that apply in their own justice system. In Indonesia, AIJI conducted a seminar for members of the Indonesian Supreme Court and Appellate Courts engaging them in discussions international experts on issues of mutual concern regarding international justice and human rights. Finally, AIJI is planning the inaugural Summer Law Institute which is slated to be held in the ASEAN region in 2008. The Institute hopes to attract participants from around the world who seek training and expertise in the field of international humanitarian law and its related institutions. The curriculum will focus on providing the expertise and skills to deal with issues of particular significance for Asia. Unlike many programs that provide academic instruction on general principles and doctrines of international humanitarian law, the Summer Institute will be oriented towards actual practice and issues of immediate concern to the region. Faculty will primarily include prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel from international tribunals as well as leading experts from the region. In many instances, the Center in Honolulu works closely with our Washington, DC office on many projects in this study area. http://www.eastwestcenter.org/research/research-program-overview/politics-governance-and-security/